The big question outstanding amid the brinksmanship Thursday over a proposed $700 billion financial bailout is fundamental. Would it work? The Bush administration says its plan to buy mortgage-related assets from financial institutions is the only way to get credit flowing again. Without it, the argument goes, banks cannot lend and businesses cannot borrow to cover payroll, inventory, new plants or new hires. The original proposal was designed to relieve pressure on financial institutions by removing impaired mortgage-related assets from their books. Those assets have fallen in value as the housing sector has fallen, knocking holes in firms' balance sheets and creating a global climate of distrust that has undermined the ability of banks to raise capital. Under the Bush proposal, and subsequent versions hammered out by congressional leaders, the Treasury Department would have offered to buy these assets. That would give companies cash to replace toxic debts, restoring capital, as well as the trust that enables banks to borrow and lend at reasonable terms. But even before partisan disputes derailed the push to clinch a deal Thursday night, economists and industry figures questioned whether it would work. Economists and market experts agreed that a government purchase of distressed assets would help reveal the extent of losses at financial institutions, a necessary step before the financial sector can rebuild itself. Many financial firms are holding assets on their books at unrealistic prices, in part to avoid taking necessary write-downs that accounting rules require when an asset becomes impaired. Because the market has frozen for these assets, companies have been able to avoid reflecting their real value on their books. One of the most important factors in evaluating the rescue plan has been one of the least clear in negotiations until now: What price would Treasury, and taxpayers, wind up paying? Some of the nation's biggest banks have spent recent days scouring their balance sheets for securities they'd like to sell to the government and at what price. Without knowing the prices Treasury will offer, banks can't decide how aggressively to unload troubled assets. Top executives at banks like Citigroup Inc. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., which hold tens of billions of dollars in securities that may be eligible for the rescue plan, have been lobbying lawmakers and Treasury officials over the past week. Their goal has been to make sure the program doesn't require banks to take further write-downs to sell assets. 'We'll be an active participant if it's set up right,' said a senior executive at a major New York bank. 'The devil is so much in the details here.' With Treasury buying these assets in the open market, every institution, whether or not they participate in the program, would have to reflect market prices on their books. 'The market for many of these mortgage-related assets is so illiquid that there's very little price information out there,' says Matthew Slaughter, an associate dean at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business. 'Once the government begins buying assets it will help the firms themselves, their investors, and their counterparties better understand their current balance sheets.' Congressional Budget Office Director Peter Orszag told lawmakers on Wednesday 'that loss of trust has sharply increased the cost of raising capital and rolling over debt, which threatens the solvency of all financial institutions.' Another potentially thorny issue is whether the plan will offer as much help to small banks, which typically didn't buy the kinds of exotic mortgage securities at the center of the market mess. Big banks that are relatively healthy would also have more leeway than small banks to dump troubled assets in a government sale. Another wrinkle could come from expected restrictions on executive pay at banks that are selling assets to the government. Democrats have insisted on such limits But the senior executive at the New York bank said the potential pay restrictions aren't likely to represent a serious impediment. 'We've spent not a nanosecond discussing it,' the executive said. 'I don't think that's a consideration at all.' But BB&T Corp. Chief Executive Officer John Allison said a pay ceiling would constitute 'a massive subsidy for incompetence.' In a Sept. 23 letter to some members of Congress, Mr. Allison wrote: 'How will companies attract the leadership talent to manage their business effectively with irrational compensation limits?'
周四，各方就7,000亿美元政府救助计划展开的最终博弈中，一个至关重要的问题浮出水面：救助计划会奏效吗？
布什政府称，其从金融机构手中购买抵押贷款相关资产的计划是恢复信贷流动性的唯一途径。如果不这样做，银行无法发放贷款、企业也无法获得贷款来支付工资、建立库存、建造新工厂和增加人手。
最初的计划设想是：通过帮助金融机构清除帐面上的不良抵押贷款相关资产，来缓解它们的压力。随着住房市场的下滑，这些资产的价值也出现下降，在资产负债表上形成亏损漏洞，同时也在全球信贷市场形成互不信任的氛围，从而损害了银行融资的能力。
根据布什政府的提议，以及国会领导人的后续修改，美国财政部(Treasury Department)将出手收购这些资产。金融机构将用这些不良资产换得的现金充实资本，同时也可以由此提振信誉度，使得各银行可以按照合理的条款进行借贷。
两党之间的争论导致财政部试图在周四晚间敲定协议的期望落空。不过，在此之前，经济学家和行业人士就已经在质疑这项救助计划能否奏效。
经济学家和市场专家认同的一点是：政府收购不良资产会有助于披露金融机构的亏损程度，而这是金融行业重建自身的必要一步。
许多金融公司记入财务报表的资产价格并不切合实际情况，原因之一就在于它们不想按照财务规则将那些变质资产进行必要的冲减。由于这些资产的交易市场已经冻结，这些公司得以不在其帐面上反映出资产的真实价值。
评估救助计划最重要的因素之一、同时也是迄今为止的谈判中最不明确的一点是：财政部、纳税人最终要付出怎样的代价？
最近几天以来，美国最大的几家银行一直在加紧整理帐面上想要出售给政府的证券资产、并权衡出售的价格。如果不知道财政部的出价，银行就无法确定出售问题资产的多寡。
过去一周，花旗集团(Citigroup Inc.)和摩根大通(J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.)等银行的高层人士一直在对议员和财政部官员进行游说。这些银行都持有数百亿美元可能符合救助条件的证券。他们的目标是：确保救助计划不会要求银行采取进一步冲减措施出售资产。
一家纽约主要银行的高管说，如果救助计划条件妥当，我们会是积极的参与者。不过，眼下的麻烦在于计划的细节方面。
如果财政部在公开市场上购买这些资产，每个机构－－无论它们是否参与救助计划，都将不得不在其帐面上反映出市场价格。
达特茅斯塔克商学院(Tuck School of Business)副院长斯劳特(Matthew Slaughter)说，交易这些抵押贷款相关资产的市场的流动性非常低，几乎没有什么价格信息。一旦政府开始购买这些资产，它将有助这些公司、公司投资者、以及公司同行更好地了解各自目前的资产负债状况。
美国国会预算办公室(Congressional Budget Office)主任奥斯查格周三向议员表示：“信任的缺失大幅增加了融资和发债成本，威胁到所有金融机构的偿付能力。”
另一个潜在的棘手问题是：救助计划能否给小银行带来同样的帮助。此类银行一般都没有购买那些身处市场危机核心的特殊抵押贷款相关证券。那些相对健康的大银行在向政府出售不良资产方面也较小银行有更大的回旋余地。
还有一个令人挠头的问题可能来自对接受政府救助银行高管进行限薪的提议。民主党人一直坚持这样的限制。
不过，上述那家纽约银行的高管说，可能的限薪规定也许不会是什么严重的障碍。“我们几乎没有花时间去讨论它，它根本不值得一提。”
不过，BB&T Corp.首席执行长艾利森(John Allison)称，限薪将会让庸才获得高薪。他在9月23日写给国会部分成员的信中说，在对薪酬进行不合理的限制后，公司如何能吸引到有领导才能的人来有效管理？
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