The surprise of recent months is not that global economic growth is slowing, but that there is any growth at all. The credit crunch of the past year has not followed the path of recent economically debilitating episodes characterised by a temporary freezing up of liquidity – 1982, 1989, 1997-98 come to mind. This crisis is different – a once or twice a century event deeply rooted in fears of insolvency of major financial institutions.
近几个月，令人惊讶的事情并非全球经济增长正在放缓，而是全球经济竟然还在增长。去年的信贷危机并未遵循最近几次经济疲软时期的老路——这几次的特点都是临时性的流动性冻结，如1982年、1989年以及1997年至1998年。这场危机与众不同，它是一次五十年或者百年一遇的事件，深深根植于人们对主要金融机构资不抵债的恐惧。
This crisis was not brought to closure by the world's central banks' injection of huge doses of short-term liquidity. Only when sovereign credits were substituted for private bank credit, first in the case of the UK (Northern Rock) and subsequently in the case of the US (Bear Stearns), was a semblance of stability restored to markets. But the London Interbank Offered Rate spreads on overnight index swaps and credit default swaps of financial institutions have not returned to the modest pre-crisis levels. Fears of insolvency have not, as yet, been fully set aside. There may be numbers of banks and other financial institutions that, at the edge of defaulting, will end up being bailed out by governments.
全球央行向市场注入巨量的短期流动性，并未让这场危机就此终结。只有当主权信用替代了私人银行信用时，市场才恢复了表面上的稳定——最初是英国的北岩(Northern Rock)案，随后是美国的贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)案。但是，伦敦同业拆借利率(LIBOR)与隔夜指数掉期(Overnight Index Swaps)和金融机构信贷违约掉期(Credit Default Swaps)之间的差值，都没有恢复到危机之前的温和水平。对资不抵债的恐惧仍未完全消除。或许有许多银行及其它金融机构处于债务违约边缘，最终将由政府出面救助。
The insolvency crisis will come to an end only as home prices in the US begin to stabilise and clarify the level of equity in homes, the ultimate collateral support for much of the financial world's mortgage-backed securities. However, US home prices will stabilise only when the absorption of the huge excess of single-family vacant homes that emerged as the US housing boom peaked in 2006 is much further advanced than it is now. New single-family home completions are currently barely under the rate of home demand generated by household formation and replacement needs. Only later this year will the current suppressed level of housing starts be reflected in completion levels consistent with a rapid rate of liquidation of the inventory glut, and this, of course, assumes that current levels of demand for housing hold up.
只有等到美国住房价格开始企稳、住房资产水平开始清晰之时，这场偿付能力危机才会终结——住房资产是金融行业很多抵押担保证券的最终抵押品。不过，2006年美国房地产繁荣顶峰期出现了大量过剩的单户型空置住房，只有当市场的消化吸收远远领先于现在水平之时，美国住房价格才会企稳。目前，新建单户型住房的完工率勉强低于因组建家庭和更换需求产生的住房需求率。只有等到今年晚些时候，新屋完工率才会反映出受压抑的新屋开工率，过剩存量的清理速度才会更快。当然，这是在假设当前的住房需求水平能够维持的前提下。
Pending that outcome, the price of equities worldwide will determine whether the international financial system can maintain a modicum of stability as it eases out of its credit crunch, or falls back into another period of angst and turmoil.
在这一结果出现之前，正在逐渐摆脱信贷危机的国际金融体系能否维持些许稳定，抑或是否又落入另外一个焦虑和混乱期，一切将取决于全球股市。
The optimistic case rests on the business world beyond finance. Given this past year's vast impairment of financial intermediation, nonfinancial corporate business has held up surprisingly well, contributing to a flow of corporate earnings that has helped sustain a stressed global stock market. To be sure, global stock prices are off a fifth from their October 2007 peaks, but still hover at levels last seen in 2006, a demonstrably less fear-ridden period than currently prevails.
乐观情况存在于金融业以外的行业。鉴于金融中介机构在过去一年里的巨额减值，非金融企业的出色表现出人意料，贡献了良好的企业收益，帮助支撑了重重压力下的全球股市。诚然，全球股价已经从2007年10月峰值跌落五分之一，但它仍停留在2006年的水平之上，而那一时期的市场明显不像当前这样普遍为恐惧所驱使。
A sustained level of global equity prices will be critical if banks are to recapitalise themselves at the higher levels daunted investors now require. The pool of capital is being augmented by a reasonably high level of saving (nearly 24 per cent of world gross domestic product), up significantly from earlier this decade. The flow of new saving will provide some support.
如果银行想要遵照担惊受怕的投资者目前的要求，在更高股价水平上对自己进行增资，那么，一个稳定的全球股价水平至关重要。较高的储蓄率（几乎相当于全球GDP的24%）增大了资本池，大大高于本世纪最初几年的水平。新增储蓄流将提供一些支持。
Capital gains, however, are just as important. This can best be observed in the context of the consolidated balance sheet of the world economy. All debt and derivative claims offset in global accounting, leaving real physical and intellectual assets and their market value reflected as net worth. Capital gains cannot finance new physical investment, but do add to global net worth. If, for whatever reason, discounting of prospective future earnings engendered by the world's physical capital stock declines, the market value of that capital stock rises with no offsetting liability. There is accordingly a larger value of equity shoring up the capital of financial or nonfinancial businesses. Should that discount rate reverse, the value of world equity will fall. Consequently, lower global stock prices could impede the recapitalisation of banks and other financial institutions. Debt issuance would also be suppressed as it leverages off the level of equity.
不过，资本利得也同样重要。在世界经济综合资产负债表的字里行间最能观察到这一点。所有债务和衍生品所有权在全球账目下相互抵消，而实物和无形财产以及它们市值则反映为净值。资本利得虽不能为新的实物投资提供融资，但却可以增加全球净值。如果出于某种原因，我们对全球实物资本存量下降引起的预期未来收益进行贴现，那么，该资本存量的市值将出现增长，却无债务可抵消。相应的，将有更大价值的股本来支撑金融业务和非金融业务的资本。一旦贴现率反转，全球股价将出现下跌。因此，更低的全球股价可能会阻碍银行及其它金融机构的增资。由于债务水平基于资产水平，债务发现也会受到抑制。
Globalisation is at the root of the past decade's unprecedented surge in world economic activity. The growth in the volume of global trade has far exceeded the pace of world real GDP growth for decades. Between 2001 and 2007 global cross-border investments (at market values) rose almost two-thirds faster than world nominal GDP, according to data from the International Monetary Fund.
全球化是过去10年全球经济活动史无前例增长背后的根本原因。几十年来，全球贸易量的增速远超过全球真实GDP的增速。国际货币基金组织(IMF)的数据显示，2001年至2007年间，全球跨境投资（以市值计算）的增长几乎比全球名义GDP的增长快三分之二。
The economic edifice – market capitalism – that has fostered this expansion is now being pilloried for the pause and partial retrenchment. The cause of our economic despair, however, is human nature's propensity to sway from fear to euphoria and back, a condition that no economic paradigm has proved capable of suppressing without severe hardship. Regulation, the alleged effective solution to today's crisis, has never been able to eliminate history's crises.
推动上述扩张的经济体系——市场资本主义——现在已被套上了枷锁，它将出现短暂的停歇或部分的删减。不过，是人类在恐惧与兴奋之间摇摆的天性让我们陷于经济困境，没有任何经济模式能够抑制这种情况的出现却不带来严重的后果。监管是人们所谓能有效解决当前危机的方案，但它在历史上从未能够消除过危机。
A financial crisis is heralded, in fact defined, by sharp discontinuities of asset prices. The crisis must thus be unanticipated. The fact that risk was heavily underpriced for much of this decade was broadly recognised in the financial community, but the timing of the sharp price correction was nonetheless a surprise.
资产价格的剧烈波动预告了金融危机的来临，事实上也是对金融危机的定义。因此，这场危机应该在意料之外。这10年的很多时间里，风险被严重低估，这个事实在金融界得到广泛承认，但急剧价格修正选择的时机仍然出乎意料。
Recent history is replete with such underpricing persisting for years. Those market players who withdraw from “long” commitments at the first sign of an excess of exuberance, risk losing market share. They thus continue “to dance” as Chuck Prince, the former Citigroup chairman put it, but always assume they will have time to exit the markets. The vast majority invariably fail. When the current crisis emerged, it was assumed that the weak links would be unregulated hedge and private funds. The losses, however, have been predominately in the most heavily regulated institutions – banks.
近代史充满了这种持续数年低估风险的现象。那些一出现过度繁荣的迹象就收回“长期”承诺的市场参与者，面临失去市场份额的风险。因此，就像花旗集团(Citigroup)前董事长查克?普林斯(Chuck Prince)所说，他们继续“跳舞”，但又总是想当然地认为自己有退出市场的时间。绝大多数不可避免会失败。当前这场危机初露端倪之时，人们认为薄弱的环节会是那些未受管制的对冲基金和私募基金。然而，绝大多数损失都出现在监管最严格的机构——银行。
We may not easily confront or accept the price dynamics of home and equity prices, but we can fend off cries of political despair which counsel the containment of competitive markets. It is essential that we do so. The remarkably strong performance of the world economy since the near universal adoption of market capitalism is testament to the benefits of increasing economic flexibility.
或许，我们无法轻易反对或接受房价和股价的变动，但我们能抵御政治绝望者建议遏制竞争市场的叫喊。我们这样做至关重要。世界经济在市场资本主义几乎普及之后取得的引人注目的强劲表现，证明了日益增加的经济灵活性的益处。
It has become hard for democratic societies accustomed to prosperity to see it as anything other than the result of their deft political management. In reality, the past decade has seen mounting global forces (the international version of Adam Smith's invisible hand) quietly displacing governmentcontrol of economic affairs. Since early this decade, central banks have had to cede control of long-term interest rates to global market forces. Previously heavily controlled economies – such as China, Russia and India – have embraced competitive marketsin lieu of bureaucratic edict. The danger is that some governments, bedevilled by emerging inflationary forces, will endeavour to reassert their grip on economic affairs. If that becomes widespread, globalisation could reverse – at awesome cost.
对于习惯了繁荣的民主社会而言，它们已经很难认识到，这种繁荣不是他们熟稔的政治管理的结果，而是由其它原因造成的。事实上，过去10年间，不断增强的全球力量——亚当?斯密(Adam Smith)“看不见的手”的国际版本——悄悄取代了政府对经济事务的控制。自21世纪初以来，各国中央银行不得不放弃对长期利率的控制，将其交给全球市场力量。之前管控严密的经济体——如中国、俄罗斯和印度——都已接纳竞争性市场，取代官僚法令。如今的危险在于，一些饱受通胀激增之苦的政府会试图重新掌控经济事务。如果上述情况普遍出现，全球化进程可能出现倒退——我们也将为此付出可怕的代价。
The writer is the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve
本文作者是美联储(US Federal Reserve)前主席。
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